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MULTINATIONAL BUSINESSES BEWARE: THE
LONG ARM OF THE UNITED STATES
ANTITRUST LAWS MAY REACH YOUr
by Julian 0. von Kalinowski*
The title of my speech today was suggested by the famous line from
Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, "BEWARE THE IDES OF MARCH."
This morbid foreboding, with some poetic license, can be related to
recent developments in the enforcement of United States antitrust laws
in the international area and the resulting impact on multinational
businesses.
Within the last year, the Supreme Court held in Pfizer, Inc. v. India,'
that a foreign nation could sue for treble damages for injuries suffered
by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws to the same extent as any
other person. This is a unique holding since previously it had been
held in United States v. Cooper Corp.2 that the United States govern-
ment was not a person within the meaning of the special treble damage
remedy embodied in section 4 of the Clayton Act., It was not until
1955, when Congress enacted section 4(a) of the Clayton Act,4 that the
United States was finally given a claim for damages for injuries arising
from antitrust violations, and Congress specifically limited the United
States to single damages "in view of the disastrous impact of treble
damages upon concerns doing a large proportion of their business with
the government."' One does not need to be skilled in the art of fore-
casting to predict what the impact of treble damage suits from some
162 foreign nations would be on companies doing business with those
nations. The exposure is mind-boggling! If the United States govern-
ment thought it had a balance of payment problem pre-tfizer, it hasn't
seen anything yet; the potential outflow of dollars either by way of set-
t This article is a slightly revised version of a speech given to the Los Angeles County
Bar Association on June 7, 1978. Robert H. Fairbank assisted in the editorial work.
* B.A., 1937 (Mississippi College); J.D., 1940 (University of Virginia). Member, State
Bars of California and Virginia.
1. 434 U.S. 308 (1978)
2. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
3. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
4. Clayton Act § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976).
5. H.R. REP. No. 422, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1955).
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tlement or treble damage judgments will certainly accentuate this bal-
ance of payments imbalance.
In another area, the Justice Department has served notice6 that it
intends to vigorously prosecute hard-core violations of the antitrust
laws in the international area where American companies or individu-
als may be involved, or, for that matter, where foreign persons are in-
volved if personal jurisdiction can be obtained over the foreign
defendants and if the subject matter jurisdictional requirements of the
Sherman Act have been met. This in itself is a foreboding development
for companies doing business in foreign countries or with foreign gov-
ernment-sponsored commercial activities. Many of the foreign govern-
ment enterprises involved may engage in price fixing activities or other
anticompetitive cartel-type activities which may be perfectly legal in
the particular country. Yet if these activities have an impact on United
States foreign commerce, United States firms participating in such ac-
tivities might well find themselves involved in a criminal case under the
Sherman Act. The penalties can be heavy.
I am sure you are aware that the 1974 Antitrust Procedures and Pen-
alties Act7 amended the Sherman Act to increase the maximum penal-
ties under that Act to (a) a one hundred thousand dollar fine and/or a
three-year jail term for individuals (making it a felony), and (b) a $1
million fine for corporations.' The Antitrust Division is seeking and
obtaining substantially increased penalties as a result of this amend-
ment.9 The Division was recently successful in obtaining jail sentences
of twenty-four to thirty months for the individual defendants and fines
of $2.5 million for the corporate defendants. 10 The seven corporate co-
defendants and two individuals were convicted by a jury of price fixing.
I must emphasize that this result is not unique. In another recent case
one individual was given an eighteen-month jail sentence."1
6. Speech by Joe Sims, Practicing Law Institute Seventeenth Annual Advanced Antitrust
Seminar on International Trade and the Antitrust Laws (Jan. 20, 1978).
7. Antitrust Procedures & Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (codified in
scattered sections of 15, 47, and 49 U.S.C.).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
9. See Justice Department Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Donald I.
Baker to all Antitrust Division attorneys and economists entitled "Guidelinesfor Sentencing
Recommendations in Felony Cases under the ShermanAct" (Feb. 24, 1977), reprinted in [1977]
803 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-1. For a more detailed discussion of the
criminal prosecution and sentencing of antitrust violators, see Note, Sentencing Antitrust
Felons, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097 (1977); Hermann, Criminal Prosecution of United
States Multinational Corporations, 8 LoY. CH. L.J. 465 (1977).
10. United States v. Arcole Midwest Corp., 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,077, case no.
2570 (N.D. I. 1977).
11. Id. 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,077, case no. 2568 (N.D. Ill. 1977). For other
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Although these cases involved domestic activity, there is no reason
why similar penalties could not be imposed for violations in the inter-
national area. The standards are identical. Indeed, the criteria used by
the government in initiating such a prosecution are identical to those
used in a domestic case-willfulness and clarity. 2
One can well imagine the consternation this policy has caused in for-
eign government circles. Indeed, some foreign government-owned
"commercial enterprises" and their officers can directly be involved in
hard-core antitrust violations. There is no immunity under United
States law for such commercial activities. 3 For example, within the
past year, the Department of Justice indicted the German state-owned
airline, Lufthansa, for participating with United States carriers in a
conspiracy to fix fares on United States-Germany military traffic
outside of the International Air Transport Association. 4 As an aside, I
might mention that the Supreme Court recently held in City of Lafay-
ette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 15 that domestic state-owned "com-
mercial enterprises" are subject to the antitrust laws.
Yet another tecent event' in the international area is the enactment of
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,16 which
added pre-merger notification requirements (section 7(a)) to the Clay-
ton Act. 7 Under section 7(a), one or both parties of an acquisition or a
merger of a designated size (including tender offers) must notify the
government during the pre-merger period and then endure a thirty-day
recent cases imposing stiff fines and criminal sentences on antitrust offenders, see United
States v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,077, case nos. 2613-15 (D. Conn.
1978) (pleas of nolo contendere in a price fixing case resulted in fines totaling $885,000 and
jail sentences for ten corporate officials from eighteen to thirty months, with all but three
months suspended for five defendants, all but thirty days suspended for four defendants and
the entire sentence for one defendant); United States v. Borden, Inc., 4 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 45,077, case no. 2579 (D. Ark. 1977) (pleas of nolo contendere in a price fixing case
resulted in corporate fines of $575,000 and jail sentences for two corporate officials of one
year, with all but sixty days suspended).
12. Speech by Joe Sims, supra note 4, at 19. Not all recent developments are gloomy for
the antitrust criminal defendant. For example, the United States Supreme Court, in United
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864, 2872 (1978), recently held that criminal liability
under the Sherman Act requires proof of criminal intent. This greatly increased the govern-
ment's burden of proof in criminal antitrust cases somewhat counterbalancing the increased
severity of criminal penalties and fines for conviction.
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(d), 1605(a) (1976).
14. United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,077,
case no. 2560 (D.D.C. 1977).
15. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
16. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383 (codified in scattered sections of titles 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976).
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waiting period before consummation. Pre-merger notification is
designed to give the government notice of large mergers so that the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Antitrust Division may
evaluate their consequences prior to their completion.
Persons subject to the pre-merger notification and waiting period re-
quirement must file with the Department of Justice and the FTC such
documentary material and information as is "necessary and appropri-
ate" to enable the government to determine whether consummation of
the acquisition or merger may violate the antitrust laws. The FTC was
directed, with the concurrence of the Department of Justice, to promul-
gate rules specifying what documentary material and information is
"necessary and appropriate."
18
In substance, the notification requirements of the Act are triggered
when (a) the acquiring person, or the person whose voting securities or
assets are being acquired, is engaged in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce19 and (b) the acquiring or acquired person has an-
nual net sales or total assets of $100 million or more and the other party
has annual net sales or total assets of $10 million or more.20 As an
additional precondition to notification, the acquiring person must hold,
as a result of the acquisition, either (1) fifteen percent or more of the
voting securities or assets of the acquired person, or (2) an aggregate
total amount of the voting securities and assets of the acquired person
in excess of $15 million.2' Anyone failing to comply with any of the
provisions of the Act is liable for civil penalties up to $10,000 for each
day during which the violation occurs.22
The jurisdictional standards of the Act are quite broad. The terms
"engaged in commerce" or "affecting commerce" conceivably could
18. Id § 18a(d)(1). The final version of these rules was promulgated on July 31, 1978. 43
Fed. Reg. 33,450 (1978). See notes 23 through 26 infra and accompanying text.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(1) (1976).
20. The dollar criteria are met if the acquisition or merger involves:
(1) the voting securities or assets of a person engaged in manufacturing with annual
net sales or total assets of $10 million or more and any acquiring person with total
assets or annual net sales of $100 million or more;
(2) the voting securities or assets of a person not engaged in manufacturing with
total assets of $10 million or more and any acquiring person with total assets or annual
net sales of $100 million or more; or
(3) the voting securities or assets of a person with annual net sales or total assets of
$100 million or more and any acquiring person with total assets or annual net sales of
$10 million or more.
15 U.S.C. § l8a(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1976).
21. Id § 18a(a)(3).
22. Id § 18a(g)(1).
[Vol. 12
MULTINATIONA4L BUSINESS BEWARE
encompass almost every activity. Thus, many primarily or even wholly
foreign acquisitions are potentially subject to the Act.
The final FTC version of the rules required to implement the pre-
merger notification program was issued in July of this year.23 It in-
cluded some helpful examples of when notification may or may not be
required when foreign acquisitions are involved. The FTC rules deal
with three types of foreign acquisitions: (1) acquisitions of foreign as-
sets or of voting securities of a foreign issuer by United States compa-
nies;24 (2) acquisitions of assets or voting securities by foreign
23. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450 (1978).
24. United States "persons" (individuals or corporations) acquiring foreign assets or voting
stock ofaforeign company (43 Fed. Reg. 33,450, 33,497-98 (1978) (to be codified in 16
C.F.R. § 802.50)):
(a) Exemption unless assets of acquired foreign company generated greater than
$10,000,000 sales in the United States last year.
EXAMPLES:
(1) Assume that "A" and "B" are both United States persons. "A" proposes selling
to "B" a manufacturing plant located abroad. Sales in or into the United States attribu-
table to the plant totaled $8 million in the most recent fiscal year. The transaction is
exempt under this paragraph.
(2) Sixty days after the transaction in example I, "A" proposes to sell to "B" a
second manufacturing plant located abroad; sales in or into the United States attributa-
ble to this plant totaled $5 million in the most recent fiscal year. Since "B" would be
acquiring the second plant within 180 days of the first plant, both plants would be
considered assets of "A" now held by "B." See § 801.13(b)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450,
33,478 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.13(b)(2)). Since the total annual sales in
or into the United States exceed $ 10 million, the acquisition of the second plant would
not be exempt under this paragraph.
(b) Exemption unless foreign company (whose voting securities a United States person
is acquiring) holds assets in the United States of $10,000,000 or generated sales of
$10,000,000 in the United States last year.
EXAMPLE:
"A," a United States person, is to acquire the voting securities of "C," a foreign
issuer. "C" has no assets in the United States, but made aggregate sales into the United
States of$12 million in the most recent fiscal year. The transaction is not exempt under
this section.
25. Acquisitions byforeign "persons" (43 Fed. Reg. 33,450, 33,498-99 (1978) (to be codified
in 16 C.F.R. § 802.51)):
(a) exempt if assets located outside the United States;
(b) exempt if acquisition of voting securities of foreign person will not result in
control over company with either (1) greater than or equal to $10,000,000 assets
located in the United States or (2) greater than or equal to $10,000,000 sales
yearly in the United States;
(c) exempt if acquisition of less than $10,000,000 assets located in the United States;
or
(d) exempt if aggregate total assets located in the United States of both foreign
"persons" involved in acquisition is less than $110,000,000.
EXAMPLES:
1. Assume that "A" and "B" are foreign persons with aggregate annual sales in or
into the United States of $200 million. If "A" acquires the assets of "B," and if no
assets in the United States or voting securities of United States issuers will be acquired,
the transaction is exempt under paragraphs (a) and (c).
2. In example 1, assume that "A" is acquiring "B's" stock and that included within
1979]
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persons;25 and (3) acquisitions of assets or voting securities by or from
foreign governmental corporations.z6
One might ask what foreign acquisitions could be subject to section 7
of the Clayton Act. The short answer is that section 7 has been stretch-
ed to reach a variety of multinational mergers. The most common mul-
tinational merger that is challenged involves a United States company
acquiring a foreign firm. For example, in United States v. Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co. ,27 Schlitz acquired voting control over a Canadian
corporation which sold its beer in the East and Midwest and was on the
verge of expanding into' California and the West. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed a trial court decision that ordered divestiture
of the Schlitz holdings in the Canadian corporations. The trial court
emphasized that Schlitz had violated section 7 by eliminating a poten-
tial competitor in the California market.2"
Similarly, a foreign corporation's acquisition of a United States firm
also poses danger of a challenge of illegality under section 7. For ex-
ample, in United States V Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd,29 the
FTC challenged an acquisition by a British company of a United States
explosives market. The British company made explosives in Canada
but had not done business in the United States. Nonetheless, the FTC
stressed that the British explosives manufacturer was the most likely
entrant into a concentrated American market. The case resulted in a
consent decree ordering divestiture.
Section 7 has also occasionally extended its tentacles to reach merg-
"B" is issuer "C," a United States issuer whose total assets are valued at $12 million.
Since "C's" voting securities will be acquired indirectly, and since "A" thus will be
acquiring control of a United States issuer with total assets of more than $10 million,
the acquisition cannot be exempt under this section.
3. In the previous examples, assume that "A" is a United States person. This sec-
tion does not apply, since the acquiring person must be a foreign person.
26. Acquisition by orfromforeign governmental corporation (43 Fed. Reg. 33,450, 33,499-
500 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 802.52)):
(a) Exempt if foreign government controls either acquiring or acquired corporation
AND the acquisition involves assets located entirely within that foreign state or
voting securities of foreign corporation.
EXAMPLE:
The government of foreign country X has decided to sell assets of its wholly-owned
corporation, "B," all of which are located in foreign country. The buyer is "A," a
United States person. Regardless of the aggregate annual sales in or into the United
States attributable to the assets of "B," the transaction is exempt under this section. (If
such aggregate annual sales were less than $10 million, the transaction would also be
exempt under § 802.50, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450, 33,497-98 (1978) (to be codified in 16
C.F.R. § 802.50.)).
27. 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), affidper curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
28. Id at 144-45.
29. [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,914 (F.T.C. 1972) (consent
order).
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ers that do not directly involve United States companies. Thus, in
United States v. CIBA Corp.,30 a Swiss corporation was on the verge of
merging with another Swiss corporation. Both had United States sub-
sidiaries that were engaged in overlapping sales of dyes, drugs, and
chemicals. The FTC challenged the impending merger, claiming that
the acquisition would lessen actual competition in the United States.
The resulting consent decree ordered the foreign companies to form a
new company to carry on the overlapping United States activity and
then to divest their holdings in that new company.
I want to emphasize that to date section 7 of the Clayton Act has
only been an occasional irritant for multinational mergers. Neverthe-
less, corporate lawyers should be aware of possible section 7 liability in
any merger involving a foreign company, especially if. (1) the foreign
company is a direct competitor of a United States firm involved in the
merger, (2) the foreign company is a likely entrant into the same United
States market in which its American merging partner is already com-
peting, or (3) the foreign company is an important source of supply to
the United States market in which its American merging partner is al-
ready competitive.
A further area of interest to the multinational corporation is the de-
veloping cooperation between nations on restrictive trade practices.
The United Nations has been the primary forum for this movement.
For example, at a .1976 United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment, an ad hoc group of experts set out to:
(a) identify those practices which are likely to result in the acquisition
and abuse of market power at the national and international levels;
(b) examine ways of improving the exchange of information on re-
strictive business practices between governments of developed and of de-
veloping countries;
(c) examine the elements of the formulation of a model law or laws
for developing countries on restrictive business practices; and
(d) examine the possibility of formulating multilaterally acceptable
principles on restrictive business practices which aim at remedying those
practices which adversely affect the trade and development of developing
countries.3
The objective was to secure voluntary adherence to mutually accept-
able principles which would "help to harmonize international opinion
about restrictive practices, shape the general behavior of most enter-
30. 50 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
31. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report of the Second Ad
Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices 37, U.N. Doc. TD/B C.2/AC.5/6 at
1(3) (1976).
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prises, and facilitate international cooperation. 2
Although only the most rudimentary steps have been taken, there is
general recognition, even among United States antitrust authorities,
that there is need for international cooperation. This attitude is re-
freshing. There is a need for harmonization in the international arena
and in the long run multinational businesses should benefit by it.
Perhaps I have gotten a bit ahead of myself. Let me revert back to
some of the basic principles involved in the application of the United
States antitrust laws in the international context. More particularly I
want to dwell on the Sherman Act's requirements, although section 7 of
the Clayton Act might also apply to multinational activities. I intend to
cover two particular areas: (1) who is subject to the antitrust laws and
(2) what justiciable defenses are available.
First, who is subject to the United States antitrust laws? I am sure
you are aware that the subject matter jurisdiction of the antitrust laws
is based upon the commerce clause of the United States Constitution,
33
and the specific antitrust statutes applying the commerce power.34 The
Sherman Act is particularly pertinent since its jurisdictional reach is as
broad as the commerce clause. It reaches activities "in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations
.... "3 The courts have interpreted Sherman Act commerce require-
ments to apply an "effects" test. Under this test courts have subject
matter jurisdiction over activity in or affecting (1) trade or commerce
among states or (2) foreign commerce (United States imports or ex-
ports) either in the United States or in a foreign country.
In determining whether a potential defendant is engaged in activity
in or affecting interstate commerce, the courts have applied two alter-
native tests. One test focuses on whether the restraint occurred within
the flow of interstate commerce. 36 The other test asks whether the re-
straint substantially affected the flow of foreign commerce. 37 Substan-
tiality is an elusive term. Some courts require proof of quantitative
substantiality: What percentage of the total volume of commerce in a
line of goods or services is affected by the restraint?38 Other courts
32. Id at 73.
33. U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
34. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-
21, 22-27 (1976); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
36. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
234 (1948).
37. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
38. See Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967).
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apply a qualitative substantiality test: Is the restraint essentially local
in nature and thus not within federal jurisdiction?39
If interstate commerce is not affected, the court must determine
whether a potential defendant is engaged in activity that restrains the
flow of goods or services imported into or exported from the United
States. The courts have applied a variety of tests. I might add that this
area of the law is a literal jungle. By way of illustration, the courts
have expressed the "effects" tests in such illuminating language as: "di-
rect and material adverse effect,"'  "substantial effect" (only relevant
when the effect is indirect),4' "direct and substantial effect,"'42 intended
to and did in fact have "some effect,"43 "substantial and foreseeable
effect on U.S. Commerce,"" anticompetitive effect resulting from con-
duct "aimed at obstructing the foreign commerce of the United
States,"45 and finally in terms of the conflicts of law approach, i e., bal-
ancing the comparative effects of the challenged conduct on the United
States and foreign country or countries.46 In sum, it seems any activity
where foreign commerce is involved is likely to be subject to the Sher-
man Act.
As to the persons within the scope of subject matter jurisdiction, it
has been determined that if a defendant's conduct restrains or affects
the flow of goods and services imported into or exported from the
United States, defendant violates section 1 of the Sherman Act whether
the acts were committed either in the United States47 or abroad,48 by a
United States citizen49 or by a foreign national.50
I might mention the Ninth Circuit's approach to subject matter juris-
diction which shows promise of being increasingly adopted in future
antitrust cases. This is the so-called conflicts of law approach. The
Ninth Circuit combines the questions of whether subject matter juris-
39. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 225, 227 (1955).
40. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., Ltd., 395 F. Supp. 221, 226 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
41. United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas.
70,600 at 77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
42. United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949).
43. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
44. U.S. Dep't of Justice Dep't, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 6
(March, 1977).
45. United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59, 66 (S.D.N.Y.
1949); Address of Michael J. Egan, Associate Atty. General, Justice Dept. (Nov. 3, 1977).
46. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976).
47. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 272 (1927).
48. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951).
49. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 271, 273 (1927).
50. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 692 (1962).
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diction exists and whether it should be exercised into a single balancing
test based on a conflict of law or "jurisdictional rule of reason" analy-
sis.51 At least five factors are balanced:52 (1) nature and amount of
effect that the challenged conduct has on United States commerce; (2)
relative importance of the interests of the nations in or affected by the
controversy; (3) nationality of the parties, their locations, and other
contacts with the nations involved; (4) degree of international conflict
that might result if jurisdiction is asserted; and (5) extent to which an
exercise in jurisdiction is likely to result in successful enforcement and
compliance.
Turning to the second area of discussion, what are the "justiciable"
defenses that a multinational corporation might invoke when charged
with an antitrust violation involving foreign commerce? There are two
such defenses which might be applicable-the defenses of (1) act of
state, and (2) sovereign compulsion.
I might add that there exists a third defense which has only limited
relevance to our discussion of today, that of sovereign immunity. This
defense potentially applies when a plaintiff seeks redress directly
against a sovereign state, its political subdivisions, agents, or instru-
mentalities, or conversely when a defendant contends that a foreign
government was involved in the alleged restraint.
Even that defense has been substantially limited. Congress, in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 53 adopted the "restrictive
principle of sovereign immunity," that is, a foreign state, its political
subdivisions, agents or instrumentalities could not be immune from suit
in any action based upon a "commercial activity," whether occurring
inside or outside of the United States, if such activity has a direct effect
in the United States.54 Thus, foreign government ownership of stocks
in a "commercial" enterprise does not create antitrust immunity. The
enterprise, as well as other corporations, such as a domestic corporation
participating in the alleged restrictive practices which violate the Sher-
man Act, can be prosecuted. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, such a
case charging Pan-Am Airlines and Lufthansa with price fixing is pres-
ently pending.5
Coming back to the two defenses previously mentioned, let me deal
first with the act of state doctrine. This doctrine provides that when-
51. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976).
52. Id at 614.
53. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
54. Id. §§ 1603(d), (e), 1605(a) (1976).
55. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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ever a controversy involves acts of a foreign government performed
within its own territory and the case cannot be adjudicated without in-
quiry into the validity of those acts, the court will decline to exercise
jurisdiction. 6 The underlying rationale of the doctrine is that the court
of one nation should not sit in judgment of the acts of another nation
on its own soil; such adjudication might embarrass the executive
branch of the United States government and its conduct of foreign af-
fairs.57
The act of state defense is potentially available to foreign states, pri-
vate domestic corporations, and foreign corporations. To illustrate that
principle, let me outline a few situations in which the act of state de-
fense was held available.
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.," one plantation owner
alleged that a competitor had violated the Sherman Act by persuading
the Costa Rican government to seize the American's land. The United
States Supreme Court refused to adjudicate the controversy, conclud-
ing that an act of state was involved: settling the controversy would
require an adjudication of the Costa Rican seizure. Likewise, in Hunt
v. Mobil Oil Corp. 59 a group of independent oil producers charged that
seven major oil companies conspired to advance their Persian Gulf oil
interests by successfully promoting the nationalization of the Hunt's
Libyan oil operations. The Second Circuit held that the act of state
defense was available: otherwise, the court would have to inquire into
"acts and conduct of Libyan officials, Libyan policies with respect to
plaintiff's as well as other oil producers' properties and the underlying
reasons for the Libyan government's actions.
60
Sometimes the act of state defense takes on a slightly different guise.
In Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Butes Gas & Oil Co. ,61 for example,
American Oil Company was charged with conspiring with Iran, Great
Britain and Sarjah (a shiekdom in the Trucial States), to deprive Occi-
dental of a valuable oil concession in the Persian Gulf. The plaintiff
argued that it was not challenging the acts of a foreign state, but rather
only defendant's role in instigating an international boundary dispute
which led to the disruption of plaintiffs concession rights. The court
concluded that it could not separate an analysis of defendant's alleged
56. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
57. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976).
58. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
59. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
60. Id at 72 (quoting Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10, 24 (1976)).
61. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
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role as a "catalyst" from inquiry into the sovereign's political acts; the
act of state doctrine thus applied.62
I do not mean to imply, however, that the act of state doctrine pre-
cludes all adjudication of possible antitrust violations merely because
the defendant links its behavior to a foreign government. In United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,63 for example, defendants who induced
Mexican governmental officials to recognize the defendants as the ex-
clusive traders in sisal hemp and to impose discriminatory taxes on ri-
val sellers could not utilize the act of state defense. The Supreme Court
stressed that "[t]rue, the conspirators were aided by discriminating leg-
islation, but by their own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, they
brought about forbidden results within the United States.""
Another classic example of a rejected act of state defense is Continen-
tal Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. 6  In Continental Ore the
defendant, a Canadian corporation, allegedly conspired with an affili-
ated American corporation to exclude a competitor. The defendant ar-
gued that the Canadian government had made it an exclusive agent of
that government. Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court held
that the act of state defense was not available: there was no evidence
that any Canadian official approved or would have approved of the
joint effort.
One final example of the act of state defense and its outer limits is
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba.66 In Dunhill a four-
judge plurality of the Supreme Court held that the act of state doctrine,
like the related sovereign immunity doctrine,67 should not be extended
to include "acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their
purely commercial operations."68 It must be noted that this question is
still unresolved since no majority of the Supreme Court has yet ac-
cepted the commercial act/public act distinction.
There is another interesting unresolved issue which I might mention.
That is, does the Noerr-Pennington doctrine69 apply to foreign as well
62. Id at 110.
63. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
64. Id at 276.
65. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
66. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
67. See text accompanying notes 54 & 55 supra.
68. 425 U.S. at 706. Accord, 1975 State Department "Leigh" letter which stated that "we
do not believe that the Dunhill case raises an act of state question because the case involves
an act which is commercial, and not public, in nature." Letter from Monroe Leigh of State
Department to the Solicitor General (Nov. 26, 1975), reprinted in 425 U.S. at 707 app.
69. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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as domestic contexts? It will be recalled that Noerr and its progeny
established the principle, subject to a "sham" exception,7" that the first
amendment protects efforts to induce a governmental body to take an-
ticompetitive actions. The governmental body involved can either be
the legislature, the executive, or an administrative or judicial body.
The courts have not squarely addressed this issue. One could argue
that the Supreme Court, in the Continental Ore7I case, implied that the
Noerr-Pennington rule protects collective efforts to lobby foreign gov-
ernments. The Department of Justice has taken the same position in its
Guidelines.7" However, it is not all that clear whether the doctrine has
application to non-democratic foreign governments. There is some
case authority to the effect that its protection is limited to democratic
governments.
73
The second defense mentioned is that of sovereign compulsion. The
underlying premise of this doctrine is that when a foreign government
commands a private party or group to undertake anticompetitive activ-
ity, there can be no antitrust liability.'
This doctrine clearly applies to actions compelled within a foreign
state's territory. It is not so clear whether the doctrine applies to re-
straints within the United States. At least one District Court has taken
the position that it does.75 On the other hand, the Justice Department
contends that the sovereign compulsion doctrine is not available in
such circumstances.
76
Moreover, there are other situations in which the sovereign compul-
sion doctrine has been held to be inapplicable. The following cases are
illustrative. In Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co.,
7 7
the United States Supreme Court held that the mere acquiescence in or
approval of a defendant's discriminatory behavior by a foreign sover-
70. "There may be-situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward
influencing governmental action is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than
an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the appli-
cation of the Sherman Act would be justified." 365 U.S. at 144.
71. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
72. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 63
(Jan. 26, 1977).
73. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F.2d 92, 107-08 (C.D. Cal.
1971), qfdper cur/am, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 905 (1972). See a/so
P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 130 (2d ed. 1974).
74. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 702-08 (1962).
75. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D.
Del. 1970).
76. Speech by D. Farmer before the annual meeting of the National Security Industrial
Association (May 23, 1977), reprinted in [current] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 50,323.
77. 370 U.S. 690, 702-08 (1962).
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eign does not trigger the sovereign compulsion defense. Similarly, a
defendant's encouragement and solicitation of foreign legislation for
purposes of monopolizing the sisal hemp market has been held to be
insufficient.78
This concludes our review of the basic principles involved. Due to
time limitations, I have laid aside such fascinating subjects as jurisdic-
tion over the person, service of process, venue matters, and compulsory
process.
I might dwell just a minute on discovery abroad since that seems to
be a particular irritant to foreign governments.79 As one might say, it
has gotten most of the press coverage.
United States courts have taken the position that documents located
abroad, even in the possession of foreign subsidiaries, are subject to
production under rule 34.1° The rationale of such a rule is that the
antitrust laws are a "cornerstone of this nation's economic policies"
and that in a suit involving such policies, the securing of information
should not be frustrated by any means.81
This assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction by United States courts,
particularly in the area of document production, has resulted in the
enactment by a number of countries of laws forbidding the production
of documents located within that country.82 The question then arises as
to whether a party may avoid the sanctions of rule 3783 (including a
default judgment) by pleading the prohibition under foreign law. The
rule, as expressed by the Supreme Court in Societe Internationale v.
Rogers,8 4 is that prohibition under foreign law is not an excuse for fail-
ure to obey a discovery order, but that the harsh sanctions of rule 37
78. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
79. Fed R. Civ. P. 34.
80. For a more detailed analysis of the rapidly expanding area of international discovery,
see Note, Taking Evidence Outside of the United States, 55 B.U.L. REv. 368 (1975); Note,
Ordering the Production of Documents LocatedAbroad---the Tenth Circuit's Approach: In re
Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 361; Note,
Discovery of Documents Located-Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747
(1974).
81. American Industrial Contracting, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 880
(W.D. Pa. 1971).
82. See The Business Records Protection Act, 1947, as amended by I ONT. REV. STAT. ch.
54 (1970) (passed in response to In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to
Canadian International Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)). See also Business
Concerns Records Act, QUE. REV. STAT. ch. 278 (1964); Shipping Contracts and Commer-
cial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87 (United Kingdom); Economic Competition Act of June 28,
1956 (Netherlands), Act of July 16, 1958, art. 39.
83. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.
84. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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are not justified when the failure is due to good faith inability to pro-
duce the documents.
Just what the parameters of good faith are is not too clear. What is
clear, however, is that the least a party must do is to attempt to negoti-
ate an exemption from foreign jurisdiction. If such a showing can be
made, a United States court usually will not impose the sanctions of
rule 37, particularly if the foreign statute imposes criminal sanctions for
disobedience. On the other hand, if there is evidence of collusion be-
tween the party and the foreign government representatives, rule 37
sanctions will be imposed.86
This is an area where some accommodation should be found be-
tween the interests of the United States and those of a foreign govern-
ment. Defendants in antitrust suits should not be subject to harsh
sanctions because of the dictates of foreign law. The courts should be
sensitive to the principles of comity.
Section 40 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations attempts to solve
this conflict by requiring a court to consider a variety of factors, such as
(a) the vital national interests of each of the states, and (b) the extent
and nature of the hardships that inconsistent enforcement actions
would impose on such a person.87 Although this is certainly a step in
the right direction, the United States courts have tended to consider
United States antitrust interests as paramount and to consider hard-
ships on the parties as secondary.
Let me sum up where we now are in the enforcement of the United
States antitrust laws in the international area. The goal of United
States antitrust laws in an international context is to maintain an open,
competitive system in both the import and export trade of the United
States and to insure that business diversity and opportunity will flour-
ish and that the most efficient technologies will be available to consum-
ers at the lowest prices. The United States government has recently
adopted a threefold approach to regulation of international trade.
First, the government endorses the vigorous enforcement of the anti-
trust laws with respect to the conduct of United States businesses
abroad. The Justice Department rejects the traditional argument by
United States corporations that this places them at a competitive disad-
vantage in the international marketplace. Second, United States courts
have demonstrated an increased willingness to impose United States
85. E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER 48-58 (1974).
86. Note, Discovery ofDocuments Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation, 14 VA. J.
INT'L L. 747, 750-51 (1974).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 40 (1965).
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laws on foreign states and their nationals if their commercial activity
has a significant anticompetitive impact on United States commerce.
Third, the executive and legislative branches have emphasized in-
creased cooperative efforts between United States and foreign govern-
ments, including rudimentary steps toward an international antitrust
code or set of principles.88
With these thoughts in mind, it is all too clear that multinational
corporations should "BEWARE" of the international reach of the
United States antitrust laws.
88. See, e.g., text accompanying note 31 supra.
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